tome. For, as Rashid writes, Pakistan's meddling with militant groups is coming home to roost: the country suffered not just the assassination of Benazir Bhutto but also 57 suicide bombs last year, killing 640 people.

Pakistan is not the only villain in this story. One reason that the Taliban is finding fertile ground in Afghanistan is that Karzai is a weak president, whose government has become a byword for corruption. Another was the CIA's funding, in the aftermath of 9/11, of the warlords, whom most Afghans blamed for their country's miserable state.

But mostly Rashid blames one Donald Rumsfeld for blocking nation building. Bush and Blair promised they would not let Afghanistan down again, as happened in 1989 when as a young reporter I watched Western aid workers, spies and advisors abandon the country literally overnight after using the mujahideen to oust the Soviets.

By following what Rashid calls "the path of least reconstruction", Bush and Blair have left Afghanistan one of the poorest countries on earth. And, for the West, one of the deadliest.