the RBN remain circumstantial. That's the nature of warfare conducted from behind banks of false identities and remotely infected networks of computers. But, during the peak of the attack, while Georgian websites were being hit by hundreds of millions of simultaneous requests, and while there were fake websites to be dismantled and studied, Armin claims enough valuable forensic evidence was left behind to make the connection. The attack was almost too successful for its own good.

The bigger question is one of motivation. The RBN is motivated by profit, not politics. Why would it involve itself in cross-border conflict? Is the RBN renting a network of infected computers to the Russian government?

"Think of it this way," says Armin. "They've become nationalised. The most likely scenario is that they receive immunity for some of their wider activities in return for

their help. Can I prove this? No, of course not.

"It's a mixture of speculation and circumstantial evidence. But it's known that the Duma has a specific strategy of cyber-warfare. So who are they going to pick as consultants? The experts who live next door."

At the time of posting this article, the Russians are handing over control to Georgian security forces but the cyberwar still rages. Georgian official websites remain offline, and the Russian government denies all responsibility for any cyber-attacks on the country.

But if, ­ as some believe, ­ the online attack was Duma-sanctioned, the timing of both July's 'dry run' and the launch of the full-scale internet bombardment on August 7 casts a very different light on Russia's claims to have been responding spontaneously to aggression when it decided to send troops into neighbouring Georgia.