Questions from Mumbai

The 60-hour battle across the commercial and tourist centre of Mumbai raises many questions about the changing nature of terrorism and the response of the authorities, not only in India, but across the world.

Have terrorists changed their tactics?
The trained ruthlessness of the Mumbai commando-terrorists marks a step-change in the tactics and methods of Islamic Jihadi extremists. Highly trained and motivated groups, equivalent to an SAS four-man combat troop, armed with light and flexible weapons - and seemingly without cumbersome equipment, such as suicide vests, that can go wrong - they were able to bring chaos and destruction to a city of 18m people. They had been trained to shoot and kill and move on quickly from target to target. They also appear to have been trained to 'fight through' their objectives.

Where did their ideas come from?
The planners made up their new concept of operations from an amalgam of old tactics and playbooks: the use of commando-style tactics is reminiscent of the attack by Black September terrorists on the Israeli team at the Munich Olympics in 1972. The manner of their approach by sea suggests they have learned how to grab vessels from the pirates of the Gulf and the Arabian Sea. Today's jihadi terrorists also know how to borrow the most effective methods of criminal groups - for moving money, arms and people.

Why did they attack hotels?
The two tourist hotels, along with the railway station and restaurants, were classic 'soft' targets. Unlike 'hard' targets, such as airports and military installations, security is minimal. Their vulnerability to attack has been exposed by the events in Mumbai and elsewhere: this was the eighth major attack in a year on international hotels, including the devastating suicide bombing of the Marriott in Islamabad.

Why was only one terrorist left alive?
We do not know precisely how each terrorist died. But, traditionally, special forces do not aim to take prisoners - it leads to the messy business of arrest, formal charge and court proceedings in which critical details of their own methods, which they like to keep secret, come into the open. When extremists took over the Iranian Embassy at Prince's Gate in London in 1980, the SAS rescue party killed all but one of the attackers, and made it plain they wished they had killed the survivor.

How many hostages were killed by Indian forces?
We do not know how many of the 170-plus fatalities had already been caused by the terrorists before the Indian security forces arrived, and how many by the troops when they entered the two hotels and the Nariman Jewish centre. But they hardly adopted a softly-softly approach. For instance, if the world could watch on television while commandos rappelled down from a helicopter above the Nariman house in broad daylight, then so could the terrorists.