In the US army’s eyes, its allies are mere clients, supplicants and proxies, says robert fox |
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You know you're in trouble when allies start falling out publicly. The New York Times has just reported that a British commander in Afghanistan has asked for American special forces to be pulled out of Helmand because they've caused too many civilian deaths there.
US special forces and private military companies like DynCorp, now running poppy eradication, rely heavily on indiscriminate aerial bombing for back-up when they get into trouble. The problem is they do not come not under the main allied command, International Sustaining Assistance Force (ISAF). Instead, they are there for Operation Enduring Freedom, fighting the 'war on terror' - and accountable to no one except the man in the white cowboy hat in Washington.
Once again the Americans have shown they are no good at alliances, and once again they have shown a lack of tactical and |
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| Only now have the Americans realised they need a policy of engagement with the Sadrist Mahdi Army – it has taken four years |
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operational subtlety bordering on the naive. Allies for them, particularly for the neo-con Republican version of history, are clients, supplicants and proxies - lower forms of life.
In Iraq and Afghanistan alike, the American gospel is the use of force - against the Taliban, al-Qaeda, 'insurgents' in general, and now Iran, which has overtaken al-Qaeda as the big enemy in Iraq, and it, of course, is responsible for the defeat of the Brits in Basra.
Only now have the Americans realised they need a policy of engagement with the Sadrist Mahdi Army - who have the sympathy of most Shia youth, and are too nationalist to be mere stooges of Tehran and the Ayatollahs. It has taken four years for the Americans to understand this, guided by an experienced diplomat, Ambassador Ryan Crocker in Baghdad, and not the military.
Being an ally does not imply a Trappist vow of silence. The British and other allies must be more open about the gaps and flaws in current American operational thinking in the Gulf and south-west Asia. 
FIRST POSTED AUGUST 10, 2007
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